[V] Electronic protection involves guarding one’s own systems from these very attacks by hardening electronic sensors and by conducting electronic emission control so it is more difficult for an adversary to locate a target. The result is a jamming of the signal that the receiving system is trying to detect, interrupting communications altogether. For a reverse example, Russia’s concept of “hybrid warfare,” or the so-called Gerasimov doctrine — a term used to describe a blend of conventional and irregular warfare as well as political and cyber warfare — was actually coined to describe what the Russian military perceived as Western military tactics. [XIX] While the Kremlin has long been experimenting in the realm of EW, the U.S. has only just re-entered the game. A Russian serviceman prepares to launch a drone during a military exercise. However, a weakness of Russian artillery is its centralized command-and-control structure, which makes it difficult for frontline troops to request fire missions. [XII] The Borisoglebsk-2 is most notable for the role it played in eastern Ukraine, allegedly impeding the use of Ukrainian drones by suppressing incoming GPS signals. [XIX] Ibid; Robert C. Rasmussen, “Cutting Through the Fog: Reflexive Control and Russians STRATCOM in Ukraine,” Center for International Maritime Security, November 26, 2015, http://cimsec.org/cutting-fog-reflexive-control-russian-stratcom-ukraine/20156. April 22, 20210. In fact, its so-called “New-Generation” or “Fourth-Generation” warfare is founded on a recognition that old Soviet-era “Deep Battle” tactics emphasizing huge armored formations deploying to battle in echelon were no longer viable given Russia’s more limited resources compared to the Soviet Red Army, as well as its persistent qualitative inferiority. They are testing us every day…”[XXVII] Russia has become so adept at employing EW that US forces must now reduce their electromagnetic footprint or risk enemies using this information to geolocate, jam, and then fire upon them. Its purpose is to deny an adversary from gaining control of, and an advantage in, the electromagnetic (EM) spectrum, while still ensuring friendly and unimpeded access for oneself and one’s allies. ELECTRONIC WARFARE: RUSSIA’S ENHANCED CAPABILITIES. For example, during an interview in 2015, Hodges said Russia demonstrated the ability to completely shut down “everything” used by the Ukrainians for … Local proxies free up conventional Russian military units and assets to intervene in the sectors they are most needed. Russia has also placed more emphasis on accurate tactical ballistic missiles such as the Iskander to deliver strikes that a Western military might employ aircraft to undertake. Finally, electronic support are actions that search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of EM emissions for the purpose of enabling the previous two functions. By 2020, Russian Electronic Warfare forces plan to update more than 60 percent of their equipment. [XXIII] In stark contrast, the U.S. has faced limited EW threats, mostly engaging in jamming efforts on enemy improvised explosive devices (IEDs) while in Afghanistan and Iraq. This means rear-area command and logistical units would be subject to deadly strikes, even if air superiority is secured. [VI] Collins, 2018, “Russia Gives Lessons”. However, Russian electronic-warfare batteries wield a multitude of systems to jam or spy upon frontline communication systems — including radio, cellular, satellite and even GPS. [VII] Learning from this experience, Russia has since prioritized investing in EW tools, with Russian President Vladimir Putin ordering at least 70% of all Russian EW equipment modernized by 2020. Does the Future of Artificial Intelligence Favor Authoritarianism? [XXIX] Jared Keller, 2019, “The Pentagon is Reportedly Getting Serious about Electronic Warfare,” Task & Purpose, June 2019, https://taskandpurpose.com/pentagon-russia-electronic-warfare. This was especially evident in the conflict in Ukraine, when the government’s reaction was initially paralyzed by uncertainty as to whether it faced a Russian invasion or a purely local uprising. Russia has committed billions of rubles to advancing its EW capabilities for use in conflicts against NATO nations, according to a recent think-tank report. Foreign Military Studies Office, p. 153. Russian Electronic Warfare System Is Capable Of Neutralizing GPS, Galileo and BeiDou Systems. In 2017 the group released the 61-page Russian New Generation Warfare Handbook, based on observation of Russian tactics in Ukraine and to a lesser extent Syria, as well as published doctrine and public statements. In Ukraine, Russian-supported forces deployed a variety of anti-aircraft systems that shot down Frogfoot attack jets, helicopter transports and gunships and even a fully loaded cargo plane, eventually forcing the Ukrainian air force to stop providing tactical air support. The Russian R-330Zh Zhitel electronic warfare system has been repeatedly spotted in the occupied part of the Ukrainian Donbas. [XXII] Furthermore, Russian EW units also worked intimately with drones and rocket artillery batteries in a highly coordinated fashion. They also help paint a veneer of political legitimacy to Russian military operations. The Borisoglebsk 2 is a mobile system. Borisoglebsk 2 . 115th Cong. [IX] In 2009, Russia also formed units entirely dedicated to EW operations. This is critical to U.S. operations, since spoofing can affect naval navigation, as well as PGM routing. The U.S. has spent nearly two decades dedicated to counterterrorism operations where it enjoyed significant qualitative and quantitative advantages over adversaries. Moscow has long been wielding more and bigger guns as a means to compensate for its forces’ qualitatively inferior training. Fitting perfectly into Russian military doctrine and its preference for blurring the lines between war and peace, EW allows Russia to engage in “non-contact operations” that jam, blind, disrupt, and demoralize an enemy without having to fire a single shot. [XXV], American troops first came into contact with high-end, Russian EW capabilities while in Syria, where they had to increasingly defend themselves against Russian jamming devices. By Drago Bosnic On Nov 16, 2020. [XIV] This system monitors electronic emissions within a 400 km range in real time on all frequency ranges, carrying out electronic intelligence-gathering and conducting jamming and electronic suppression whenever needed. [X] Still, the overall number of soldiers serving in EW units is relatively low, as they must undergo specialist training to become proficient in all EW tools. These sniper fronts can pin down larger enemy formations with accurate fire — then call down artillery strikes on the immobilized enemy to inflict even greater casualties. Space-based electronic warfare. For Russia, EW is used to simultaneously assist the country’s forces in seeing its adversary while also blinding the enemy so they can no longer target Russian Armed Forces. Smart Devices: A Necessary Evil for Military Operations? Instead, US forces must now fight their way through a degraded information environment on a daily basis, facing a diminished ability to synchronize and execute operations. At the operational level, Russia has moved away from a force organized around large divisions to smaller but still well-rounded brigades — though the divisional echelon may soon be reemphasized to ease administrative burdens. © Copyright 2021 Center for the National Interest All Rights Reserved, 5 Places World War III Could Start in 2018, This Is What Happens if America Nuked North Korea. [XXVI] The head of US Special Operations Command, General Raymond Thomas, called Syria “the most aggressive EW environment on the planet from our adversaries. Indeed, the US Army has almost no EW capability, whereas Russia’s most powerful EW capabilities reside within its land forces.[XXXI]. With smaller radar cross sections that make them difficult to detect, fifth-generation jets such as the F-35 will be harder to target and can better slip into adversary airspace in order to conduct EW and strike operations. [III] Thomas Grove, 2019, “The New Iron Curtain: Russian Missile Defense Challenges U.S. Air Power,” The Wall Street Journal, January 2019. https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-missile-defense-draws-a-new-iron-curtain-against-u-s-military-11548255438. “Divnomorye” is a breakthrough development of Russian scientists and designers. Indeed, Moscow is placing renewed emphasis on “information warfare” to mold the human terrain of a conflict zone in its favor. Even though the aforesaid statements may, in some dimension, be propagandist in their nature, considering the wide range of efforts undertaken within that scope, they are probably justified. As told by Laurie Buckhour, a retired Army colonel, “All of a sudden your communications won’t work, or you can’t call for fire, or you can’t warn of incoming fires because your radars have been jammed and they can’t detect anything.”[XXVIII], Considering the wide range of efforts undertaken by Russia to improve its own EW capabilities relative to its Western counterparts, the U.S. will need to work-perhaps for the first time-on regaining unchallenged dominance in a domain of operations. While there are numerous systems dedicated to EW at the disposal of the Russian Armed Forces, several stick out from the rest. [X] Kjellen, 2018, “Russian Electronic Warfare,” p. 30. Interest in this arose back in the 1980s as part of a large-scale effort to develop countermeasures against America’s Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which was aimed at forming a space-based shield against incoming Soviet missiles. Anti-access/area-denial weapons may target Western forces’ air and logistical support: Western militaries have come to expect on-call air support and medical evacuation. The Russian Krasukha-2 electronic warfare (EW) system is designed to jam airborne early warning aircraft radar from as far away as 250 kilometers (155 miles). However, Russian electronic-warfare batteries wield a multitude of systems to jam or spy upon frontline communication systems — including radio, cellular, satellite and even GPS. The goal is to emit “noise” in an over-powered signal strong enough to overload the adversary’s receivers. In these conflicts, the U.S. was able to quickly gain local air, sea, and land superiority with relatively low risk to its armed forces. This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Such an effort will inevitably be colored by analysts’ cultural biases and worldviews, as well as a degree of paranoia intrinsic to the military profession. The Russian Ministry of Defense conducted exercises on the use of long-range electronic warfare systems. Moscow prefers to rely on local proxies to do the brunt of the fighting: Moscow has made increasing use of allied irregular forces and private mercenary companies to lead operations in Ukraine and Syria, bolstered by Russian advisors, military equipment and training. Its role is to disrupt mobile satellite communications and satellite-based navigation signals (GPS), basically jamming of HF/UHF (both terrestrial and aircraft) radio channels and GPS. In Ukraine, Russian forces have even deployed platoon-sized sniper units in depth on narrow fronts, with the most elite sharpshooters deployed over a mile to the rear while local proxies man the front line. Western militaries depend on extensive command-and-control infrastructure and near real-time tracking of troop positions as force multipliers. Countries like Russia and the U.S. are concerned about EW because key objectives like gaining air superiority greatly depend on achieving EW supremacy. A Russian R-330Zh Zhitel electronic warfare system, which is used to jam cellular satellite communications and is among the many electronic warfare platfroms Russia has deployed to … Russian Electronic Warfare, Cyber and Information Operations in Ukraine: Implications for NATO and Security in the Baltic States Duncan McCrory RUSI Journal, 24 February 2021 Cyber, Russia, Information, Technology. The handbook paints an intimidating picture of a military ready to combine old strengths in artillery and anti-aircraft systems with new technologies and tactics, leveraging drones, electronic warfare, information warfare and massed sniper fire. [II] Jonas Kjellen, 2018, “Russian Electronic Warfare: The Role of Electronic Warfare in the Russian Armed Forces,” FOI, September 2018, file:///Users/mcreery/Downloads/FOI-R–4625–SE.pdf, p. 13. Recommended: 5 Places World War III Could Start in 2018, Recommended: How North Korea Could Start a War, Recommended: This Is What Happens if America Nuked North Korea. Troops in Syria,” Foreign Policy, July 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/30/russian-jamming-poses-a-growing-threat-to-u-s-troops-in-syria/. The system, based on KamAZ-5350 6×6 trucks, was spotted with Russian peacekeepers in Artsakh in a video that was shared by Global News on November 14. [XX] Paul McLeary, 2018, “Russia Winning Info & Electronic War in Syria, US & UK Generals Warn,” Breaking Defense, 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/russia-winning-information-electronic-war-over-syria-us-uk-generals-warn/. [13] As the AWG puts it, the proxies create several useful effects for successful Russian military operations: “confusion, deniability and additional manpower.”. Jamming is a key tool in electronic attack, and one that is commonly referenced in EW literature. Russian electronic warfare (EW) has attracted an unusual amount of attention in recent years, most notably because of the well-documented presence, and use, of new Russian EW equipment in eastern Ukraine—and also since 2015 in Syria. The Russian Armed Forces are continuing their covert offensive operations in Ukraine, even as Moscow denies direct involvement. This unique electronic warfare system is designed to protect command posts, groups of troops, air defence systems, and important industrial and military-political centres from detection by enemy radars. Learn how your comment data is processed. Photo Credit: RIA Novosti. [XXX] Freedberg, Jr., 2018, “HASC EW Expert”, [XXXI] Freedberg, Jr., 2018 “Electronic Warfare Trumps Cyber”, [XXXII] Loren Thompson, 2016, “The Evolution of Jet Fighters Takes a Giant Leap with ‘Fifth-Generation’ Planes,” Forbes, June 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/06/01/what-makes-a-jet-fighter-fifth-generation/#5a89f9b66655, [XXXIII] Freedberg, Jr., 2018, “Electronic Warfare Trumps Cyber”. [XIII] “Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine,” OSCE, August 2015, http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/177826. Development of the system started in 2004 and evaluation testing successfully completed in December 2010. InformNapalm volunteers , in their turn, closely monitor this type of data and look for visual evidence that can give a better understanding of the purpose and logic behind a particular type of military hardware being in a certain area. Moscow uses cyberwarfare and information operations for offensive ends: Moscow has invested to an unparalleled degree in an information-warfare apparatus designed to manipulate foreign public opinion and break into adversary computer systems for both political and military ends. The U.S. Army’s Asymmetric Warfare Group was formed in 2006 to identify gaps in U.S. military doctrine, equipment and field tactics, and to study how potential adversaries are developing tactics to exploit them. [XVII] In general, an actor conducts spoofing by relaying false positioning information to an adversary. Here's What You Need to Remember: Western militaries depend on extensive command-and-control infrastructure and near real-time tracking of troop positions as force multipliers. “Electronic warfare often deals with degrading the enemy’s sensor and weapons systems. (UAS), electronic warfare (EW) jamming equipment, and long range rocket artillery, it took the Soviet model out of the 1980s and into the 21st Century. By contrast, Russian forces are not accustomed to assuming air superiority — this was true even during victorious campaigns late in World War II — and thus have invested heavily in a diverse array of anti-aircraft systems, from short-range man-portable surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft vehicles at the battalion level to “strategic” S-300 or S-400 missiles that can threaten aircraft hundreds of miles away. This can also be thought of as the reconnaissance element of EW. Remarkably, it is Russia that presents some of the stiffest competition, with increasing agreement among experts in the field that Russia has taken a huge, and somewhat unexpected, leap forward in its EW capabilities. [I] However, as the U.S. turns toward near-peer competition, the days of permissive deployments are quickly coming to an end. [XVI] Spoofing is when an actor mimics, or “spoofs,” legitimate Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals in order to manipulate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) data. Russia's investment in its electronic, cyber and information capabilities should concern NATO states. The first is the Borisoglebsk-2, a system designed to jam mobile satellite communications and radio-navigational units. Most concerning are the growing capabilities of adversaries in the realm of electronic warfare (EW). [I] United States. 2nd sess. Russian electronic warfare (EW) system de-activated the control system of hostile drones launched by terrorists at its Hmeymim air base in Syria yesterday. Russian Electronic Warfare Systems on the ground. [VIII] Timothy Thomas, 2016, Russian Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century Reform and Geopolitics. Russian-supported forces using drone spotters have delivered deadly artillery fires against Ukrainian formations on the move that inflicted over a hundred casualties in one attack. The guide suggests only two tactical responses — either disengage immediately, even at the likely cost of some casualties, to avoid getting hit by an artillery strike, or to reply with accurate sniper or heavy-weapons fire. Mi-8MTPR-1 electronic warfare helicopter (Picture source: Army Recognition) The Mi-8MTPR-1 is a standard Mi-8MTV-5-1 with a ‘Rychag-AV’ active jamming station installed onboard. Every two or three weeks, the latest Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems are featuring in the texts of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) reports. [XVIII] Most importantly, when used to support military operations, Russian EW systems limit the degree to which US and allied airpower and PGMs can be brought to bear before they are jammed. (U) Ukraines 2014 Euromaidan Revolution overthrew a corrupt Russian supported president and threatened to place a pro-European government in power on the very outskirts of the Russian Federation. STEPANAKERT – Russian peacekeeping forces in Artsakh (Nagorno-Karabakh) have deployed the advanced RB-341V “Leer-3” electronic warfare system. The use of sophisticated types of modern military equipment, however, clearly hints at who is behind the registered attacks. We have to catch up…[EW] is an area that we’re behind our adversaries, we’re not moving fast…we’ve just lost so much capability.”[XXIX] The U.S. currently has too few EW assets, with many of them being old and outdated compared to Russia. Today, EW has become integral to Russia’s approach to warfare in the modern era, where it has gained extensive experience in Ukraine and Syria. Russian military relies on artillery to destroy enemy formations: Russia’s fondness for the “god of war” dates back several centuries, and according to the guide, Russian tactics still emphasize artillery as a decisive instrument for destroying enemy formations, while maneuver units handle mopping up the survivors. Russian opinion-makers are continuously stressing the fact that in the area of Electronic Warfare, the Russian forces still have a great advantage over their western counterparts. • Following failures of Russian electronic warfare efforts during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Russia has concentrated on sharpening its capabilities in the electromagnetic spectrum. Once Russia’s own signal is locked-on instead of the real GNSS signal, it begins to feed the receiver false PNT information. Most concerning are the growing capabilities of adversaries in the realm of electronic warfare (EW). [XXIV] In fact, the U.S. only started engaging in offensive EW in the Middle East within the last few years, shutting down enemy radios so they cannot communicate or call in reinforcements. Russia’s Krasukha-2 EW system also possesses the ability to analyze signal types and then jam adversary’s radar. Despite progress in professionalizing, the Russian military remains largely made up of conscripts who, after four months of basic training, only serve for another eight before a new group of fresh recruits is rotated in. [XXXII] However, no one aircraft will allow the U.S. to successfully compete against all aspects of Russia’s EW capabilities. As assessed by Roger McDermott, the Russian EW forces are well-equipped, well-coordinated, and well-integrated with other combat arms like air defense and artillery. Sputnik International News. [XIV] Thomas, 2016, Russian Military Strategy, p. 159. In Ukraine, the wide-scale adoption of drones has reportedly been a “game changer” in the effectiveness of artillery. While jamming Ukrainian communications, Russia’s own drones would triangulate the sources of electronic emissions to find targets. Speaking on the topic of US electronic warfare missions, James Faist, the Pentagon’s Under Secretary for Defense Research and Engineering, stated “There are well defined areas that we’re behind our adversaries. Click to share on Twitter (Opens in new window), Click to share on Facebook (Opens in new window), Beyond Huawei – 5G and US National Security, In Historic Trilateral Summit, the U.S., Russia, and Israel Focus on Mutual Interests, © 2021 Georgetown Security Studies Review, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russias-missile-defense-draws-a-new-iron-curtain-against-u-s-military-11548255438, https://www.ausa.org/articles/russia-gives-lessons-electronic-warfare, https://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-12.pdf, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5c99488beb39314c45e782da/1553549492554/Above+Us+Only+Stars.pdf, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/02/electronic-warfare-trumps-cyber-for-deterring-russia/, http://cimsec.org/cutting-fog-reflexive-control-russian-stratcom-ukraine/20156, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/10/russia-winning-information-electronic-war-over-syria-us-uk-generals-warn/, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/30/russian-jamming-poses-a-growing-threat-to-u-s-troops-in-syria/, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/hasc-ew-expert-bacon-us-not-prepared-for-electronic-warfare-vs-russia-china/, https://taskandpurpose.com/pentagon-russia-electronic-warfare, https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2016/06/01/what-makes-a-jet-fighter-fifth-generation/#5a89f9b66655, The U.S. Military’s Greatest Contemporary Adversary: COVID-19. [XVI] “Above Us Only Stars: Exposing GPS Spoofing in Russia and Syria.” C4ADS, 2019, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/566ef8b4d8af107232d5358a/t/5c99488beb39314c45e782da/1553549492554/Above+Us+Only+Stars.pdf. It periodically featured both in the OSCE SMM reports and in the photographs that InformNapalm volunteer intelligence community published in the course of their OSINT investigations.This system entered service with the Russian army in 2008, and the Russian … In December 2010, the Russian army received their first land-based Army operated multifunctional electronic warfare system known as Borisoglebsk 2 developed by Sozvezdie. Although Russia’s EW capabilities are a daunting challenge to the U.S. today, this was not always the case. “Electronic Warfare — Myths and Facts — Part I” “How unique are Russian Army EW systems?” “Recently Russian electronic warfare systems have acquired the aura of some kind of super weapon, capable, according to average opinion, of causing panic in … [XVIII] Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 2018, “Electronic Warfare Trumps Cyber for Deterring Russia,” Breaking Defense, February 2018, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/02/electronic-warfare-trumps-cyber-for-deterring-russia/. Leer-2 VPK-233114 [XI] Thomas, 2016, Russian Military Strategy, p. 156. The helicopters are designed to Mi-8MTPR-1 is equipped with active Rychag-AV jammer, which can blind the adversary in a radius of several hundred kilometers. [XII] Thomas, 2016, Russian Military Strategy, p. 157. Once targets were located and confirmed, an overwhelming artillery barrage would be called in. Of course, the AWG’s handbook is in attempt to understand an adversary’s warfare from the outside, rather than reflecting how the Russian military perceives its own tactics. Cong. Russia s Electronic Warfare III Russia s Electronic Warfare I Executive Summary • Russia’s Armed Forces’ electronic warfare (EW) capability development will pose a serious challenge to the proper planning and execution of NATO’s defence of the Baltic states, and NATO’s entire Eastern Flank, in the event of a Russian assault. By contrasts, Russia’s authoritarian structure silences political opposition and independent media outlets that could undermine information campaigns, and projects a philosophy of universal cynicism to instill doubt in counterpropaganda. [XXV] Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., 2018, “HASC EW Expert Bacon: US ‘Not Prepared’ for Electronic Warfare vs. Russia, China,” January 2018, Breaking Defense, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/01/hasc-ew-expert-bacon-us-not-prepared-for-electronic-warfare-vs-russia-china/. While Russia frequently asserts its supremacy in the field of EW, this time it might actually be true. Among major accomplishments for the Russian defense industry was the delivery to the military of the latest electronic warfare (EW) systems—“Vitebsk,” “Krasuha” and “Moskva.”
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